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INTRODUCTION

"The various forms of mental suffering are as numberless as the
capacities of the human soul for torturing itself."1 Within the almost
infinite variety of mental suffering, the courts have expressly recog
nized certain categories of suffering which are compensable elements
of damages in an action for personal injuries. Along with the mental
distress that accompanies pain, the courts have permitted compensa
tion for fright and shock at the time of injury, humiliation caused by
disfigurement, anxiety over the inability to make a living and fear of
future incapacity, disability, or death. 2 Recovery for fear of future ill
. ness or disability is the topic of this article. Anxiety over future conse
quences of an injury is an element of mental suffering that is
• Principal, Suisman, Shapiro, Wool, Brennan, Gray & Faulkner, P.C., New
London, Connecticut. Fellow, National Board of Trial Advocacy; Fellow, American Col
lege of Trial Lawyers; Fellow, Roscoe Pound Association; and Governor, Connecticut
Trial Lawyers' Association. A.B., magna cum laude, Providence College, 1960; LL.B.,
University of Connecticut, 1963.
•• Associate, Suisman, Shapiro, Wool, Brennan, Gray & Faulkner, P.C., New
London, Connecticut. Member, Connecticut and American Trial Lawyers' Associations.
B.A., College of the Holy Cross, 1980; J.D., University of Connecticut, 1983.
1. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 88, at 315
(1935)[hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK].
2. [d. at 316-317. See generally, J. STEIN, DAMAGES AND RECOVERY IN PERSONAL
INJURY AND DEATH ACTIONS §§ 34-44 (1972 & Supp. 1984) [hereinafter cited as STEIN].
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compensable. 3 The development of the feared future consequence
need not be reasonably certain or probable. 4 Instead, a plaintiff is enti
tled to recover for anxiety over the merely possible occurrence of fu
ture disability.s Fear or anxiety over future complications arising out
of an injury caused by the tortfeasor is not only compensable, but can
be a substantial element of a plaintiffs damages.

II.

DAMAGES

Before discussing the issue of compensation for fear of future dis
ability, the purpose of damages in a personal injury action must be
considered. The objective in any personal injury action is to compen
sate the person injured by a tortfeasor's wrongdoing. A monetary
award for damages is given to the plaintiff in an attempt to restore the
injured person to his condition before he was injured. 6 Thus, damages
serve as compensation for the injury sustained by the plaintiff.
The elements of damages recoverable in a personal injury action
include pain and suffering, loss of earnings and impairment of earning
capacity, and reasonable costs of medical treatment. 7 The determina
tion of damages in a personal injury action is peculiarly a function of
the jury.s The jury has broad discretion in awarding damages: a jury
award will be left alone unless there is a clear abuse of discretion or
improper behavior that is prejudicial.9
Recovery for loss of earnings and earning capacity and for medi
cal treatment is easily understood; recovery for pain and suffering is
not. The category of pain and suffering contains two separate ele
ments: pain is the immediate physical effect of an injury, whereas suf
fering concerns the resulting mental distress. 1O Although not directly
connected to bodily injury, mental suffering accompanies pain and the
two are difficult to distinguish. I I Thus, one who sustains bodily inju
STEIN, supra note 2, § 33, at 53.
Id. at § 41.
5. Id.
6. 2 F. HARPER AND F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS, § 25.1 (1956)[hereinafter cited
as HARPER AND JAMES]; M .. MINZER, DAMAGES IN TORT AcrIONS, § 1.02, at 1-6, n. 1
3.

4.

and cases cited therein. (MB 1982)[hereinafter cited as MINZER].
7. HARPER AND JAMES supra note 6, at §§ 25.8 - 25.10.
8. Mansfield v. Company of New Haven, 174 Conn. 373, 374-75, 387 A.2d 699, 699
(1978). Other jurisdictions have explained the role of the jury in determining damages in a
similar fashion. See MINZER, supra note 6, § 1.00, at 1-4.
9. See A. SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES, § 1325 (9th ed.
1912)[herinafter cited as SEDGWICK)'
10. MCCoRMICK, supra note 1, § 88, at 317.
11.

Id.
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ries is entitled as a matter of law to recover not only for pain caused by
the injury, but for the mental suffering as well. 12
While damages for loss of earnings or medical expenses are to
some extent susceptible of calculation, the same is not true of damages
for pain and suffering. 13 Pain and suffering is a peculiarly personal
element of a plaintifrs damages and, as such, is nebulous and indeter
minate. As explained by one commentator: "The law has no standard
by which to measure pain and suffering in money. This must be done
by the jury in their discretion. . . ." 14 Because of its nature, recovery
for pain and suffering is often the largest portion of an award in a
personal injury action. IS In a recent decision by the high court of
Kentucky, in which a jury verdict of $390,000 was reinstated,
$224,500 of the total award was for the plaintifrs pain and suffering. 16
As this case illustrates, pain and suffering can be an important basis of
recovery.
III.

DISCUSSION

An early Connecticut supreme court decision permitted the jury
to consider the fact of increased susceptibility to illness and the result
ing anxiety as a distinct element of damages. In Figlar v. Gordon,17
the court upheld a jury verdict awarding damages to a sixteen year old
plaintiff for injuries including a depressed skull fracture and laceration
of the brain which she sustained when she was struck by the defend
ant's motor vehicle. IS Medical evidence was presented establishing a
12. SEDGWICK, supra note 9, § 47, at 92. See Ramson v. N.Y. and Erie R.R., 15
N.Y. 415, 421-22 (I 857)("That pain and suffering [are] a real and substantive injury cannot
be disputed."); accord Merrill v. L.A. Gas & Elec., 158 Cal. 499, 512, III P. 534, 540
(1910).
13. SEDGWICK, supra note 9, § 41, at 46-47.
14. MCCORMICK, supra note I, § 88, at 315.
15. E.g., Esteves v. Somco Fuel, Inc., (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980) as reported in Personal
Injury Newsletter 317 (May 11, 1981), in which the plaintiff, a 70 year old apartment build
ing superintendent, received second and third degree burns over half of his body when an
apartment building boiler exploded. The plaintiff, who was hospitalized for 77 days and
had permanent nerve damage, was awarded $1,098,000; $900,000 of the total award was
for pain and suffering. See also Martin v. New Orleans, 678 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1982), in
which the plaintiff was shot, causing a bullet to become lodged in his neck near the spinal
cord, creating the risk of life-threatening future complications. A jury award of $500,000
was not excessive "in light of this emotional burden and the serious physical risk" the
plaintiff would always have. Id.
16. Davis v. Gravis, 672 S.W.2d 928 (Ky. 1984).
17. 133 Conn. 577, 53 A.2d 645 (1947).
18. Id. at 584, 53 A.2d at 648. The plaintiff also sustained a comminuted fracture of
the right tibia and fibula. At the time of trial, the plaintiff walked with a limp and had a ten
percent loss of use of the lower right leg. Id. at 584-85, 53 A.2d at 648.
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possibility that the plaintiff might develop epilepsy within 10 to 15
years following the accident. 19 In discussing the plaintiffs injuries, the
court stated that:
While the evidence would not justify an award of damages based
upon the occurrence of epilepsy in the future because it went no
further than to deal with this as a possible result, the danger that it
might ensue was a present fact and the jury was entitled to take into
consideration anxiety resulting therefrom. 20
Based upon the plaintiffs injuries, including anxiety over the possibil
ity of developing epilepsy, the jury verdict was upheld. 21
Interestingly, the only authority cited by the Connecticut court in
support of permitting recovery for anxiety as to future disability was
earlier Connecticut law permitting recovery for pain and suffering in
general.22 With little explanation the Connecticut court made a leap
from permitting recovery for mental suffering in general terms to per
mitting recovery for a distinct element of mental suffering: mental suf
fering caused by fear of possible future illness or disability.
Although not expressly explained by the court, recovery for fear
of a future disability is a separate element of damages, distinguishable
from recovery for the future illness or disability itself.23 Recovery for
fear or anxiety over future complications arising out of an injury is
allowed when there is only a possibility that the feared complication
will occur.24 There is no requirement of certainty or probability as to
Id. at 585, 53 A.2d at 648.
Id.
21. Id. at 585-86, 53 A.2d at 648.
22. Id. at 585, 53 A.2d 648 (citing Orlo v. Connecticut, 128 Conn. 231, 21 A.2d 402
(1941), a case of first impressio,! permitting recovery for negligently inflicted emotional
distress where no physical injury was sustained). The first Connecticut decision permitting
recovery for mental suffering related to physical injury was Seger v. Barkhamstead, 22
Conn. 290 (1853), in which the court stated that the plaintiff was entitled to recover for his
actual injuries and that his injuries included mental suffering. The court explained:
His mind is no less a part of his person than his body: and the mental suffering of
the former are often times more acute and also more lasting than those of lat
ter. . . The dismay, and the consequent shock to the feelings which is produced
by the danger attending a personal injury, not only aggravates it, but are fre
quently so appalling as to suspend the reason and disable a person from warding
it off; and to say, that it does not enter into the character and extent of the actual
injury, and for a part of it would be an affront to common sense.
Id. at 299. See also Maisenbacker v. Society Concordia, 71 Conn. 369, 377, 42 A. 67, 69
(1899)(mental suffering is a natural and direct result of an assault and may be proved as an
element of actual damages).
23. MCCoRMICK, supra note 1, § 88, at 315. See also STEIN, supra note 2, §§ 41, 42.
24. See e.g., Murphy v. Penn Fruit Co., 274 Pa. Super. 427, 418 A.2d 480 (1980),
discussed infra note 51.
19.
20.
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the development of the future consequence which is the source of the
plaintitrs mental suffering. 2s In contrast, recovery for the future com
plication or disability itself i!), in most jurisdictions, predicated upon a
showing that the future disability is medically probable or reasonably
certain. 26 Both the courts and commentators have criticized the inad
missibility of evidence of the less than certain or probable conse
quences of an injury. Wigmore notes that: "The courts have . . .
proceeded upon a confused apprehension of a legitimate doctrine of
Torts, namely, that recovery may be had for such injurious conse
quences only as are fairly certain or probable, not for merely possible
harm."27 Wigmore concludes that the exclusionary rules should not
be applicable to recovery of personal injury damages, inasmuch as the
application precludes any testimony as to future illness or disability.28
Notwithstanding such criticism and even though there has been a
judicial movement toward a less strict standard of proof,29 most juris
dictions continue to require medical certainty or reasonable
probability in order for any future disability to be compensable. This,
in part, illustrates the importance of recovery for the mental suffering
caused by anxiety resulting from an injury. One commentator criti
cized the reasoning of the Figlar court in permitting an award for anxi
ety over future consequences as "semantical shadow-boxing to escape
the harshness of the reasonable certainty standard."30 Escaping the
certainty standard, however, is not the reason for permitting recovery
for anxiety. Anxiety is a separate element of a plaintitrs damages. Its
importance rests on its nature as a peculiarly personal element of dam
ages. Such mental suffering is clearly compensable apart from its rela
tionship to the actual disability feared. Thus, whether or not a futur~
25. See e.g., Bowley v. Duca, 80 N.H. 548, 120 A. 74 (1923)(damages recoverable for
mother's apprehension that child would be born deformed despite scientific evidence to the
contrary).
26. For a discussion of the related issue of recovery for future consequences of an
illness, see Brachtenbach, Future Damages In Personal Injury Actions - The Standard 0/
Proof, 3 GONZAGA L. REV. 73 (1968)[hereinafter cited as Brachtenbach]. An early Con
necticut court discussing recovery for future pain and suffering stated that: "When a plain
tiff has by a fair preponderance of the evidence satisfied the jury that future pain and
suffering in consequence of his injur[ies] is reasonably likely, or probable, or to be expected,
he should be compensated for these as well as for those which are certain to occur." John
son v. Connecticut Co., 85 Conn. 438, 441, 83 A. 530, 531 (1912).
27. 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 663 (Chadbourn rev. 1979).
28. 7 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 1976 (Chadbourn rev. 1979).
29. See e.g. Feist v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 267 Or. 402, 517 P.2d 675 (1973);
Schwegel v. Goldberg, 209 Pa. Super. 280, 228 A.2d 405 (1967).
30. Brachtenbach, supra, note 28 at 87. Interestingly, contrary to the author's de
scription of the Figlar court's reasoning as a forerunner to an outright repudiation of the
probability or certainty requirement;-the requirement has to date retained its validity.
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injury can be established absent probability or certainty, recovery for
fear of the possibility of future consequences remains a viable and im
portant element of pain and suffering.
Recovery for present anxiety over possible future illness is justi
fied on the grounds that the plaintiff must bring an action for damages
within the time limits fixed by law. All damages, past, present and
future, must be determined in a single action. 3! Fear of the possible
future consequences of an injury is considered as a matter of law in
order to make the plaintiff whole. 32 As explained by one commenta
tor: "So where one was bitten by a dog suspected of being bad, he was
allowed to recovery for his fear of evil results ...."33 Thus, the
plaintiff is entitled to present evidence establishing fear of future con
sequences and is entitled to a jury charge on the subject. 34 The de
fendant, in turn, has the right to move for a new trial on the grounds
that a resulting jury award may be excessive. 3s
A leading argument against permitting recovery for future dam
ages generally, and fear of future damages specifically, is that such
damages cannot be accurately determined by the trier of fact. An
early decision 36 stated in regard to pain and suffering: It "is intangi
ble, incapable of test or trial."37 In a divided New York decision per
mitting damages for fear of future illness,38 the dissenting opinion
argued that "recovery would depend upon the SUbjective mind of the
31. 1 J. SUTHERLAND, LAW OF DAMAGES (4th Ed. 1916); See also Filer v. N.Y.
Central R.R., 49 N.Y. 42, 44-45 (1872); Schwegel v. Goldberg, 209 Pa. Super. 280, 287,
228 A.2d 405, 409 (1967) ("[T]he plaintiff was entitled to recover not only the damages
which had been actually sustained . . . but also compensation for future damages. . . .").
32. E.g. Feist v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 267 Or. 402, 517 P.2d 675 (1973) (condition
of being susceptible to a disease is compensable, even absent any present harm caused by
the possibility); Schwegel v. Goldberg, 209 Pa. Super. 280, 287, 228 A.2d 405, 409 (1967)
(nothing "evidentially improper" about admitting evidence of the plaintitrs possible devel
opment of epilepsy after sustaining a fractured skull).
33. SEDGWICK, supra note 9, § 47 at 76-77. Sedgwick also stated that "Mental anxi
ety and distress, which, though the direct and natural result of the injury, are independent
of it, are subjects of compensation." Id. Accord, MCCORMICK, supra note I, § 88, at 316;
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 90S, comment e (" as an element of damages for a
tort, one may be entitled to recover for a feeling of anxiety . . . if this is the expectable
result of the defendant's tortious act ....").
34. 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 663 (Chadbourn ed. 1979). See also Schwegel v.
Goldberg, 209 Pa. Super. 280, 281, 228 A.2d 405, 405.
35. MCCoRMICK, supra note I, § 18, at 71.
36. Southern Pacific Co. v. Hetzer, 135 F. 272 (8th Cir. 1905).
37. Id. at 274. The court added that evidence of pain and suffering, "like that which
convicted the alleged <Vitches, rests entirely in the belief of the sufferer and . . . is not
susceptible of contradiction or rebuttal." Id. at 274.
38. Ferrara v. Galluchio, 5 N.Y. 2d 16, 152 N.E.2d 249,176 N.Y.S.2d 996 (1958).
See discussion of the Ferrara decision infra notes 63 & 64 and accompanying text.
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litigating plaintiff and speculation by the physician."39
Those courts permitting recovery for present fear of future illness
have done so based upon common sense, which is the basis for recov
ery for pain and suffering in general. As noted by one commentator:
"The chief reliance for reaching reasonable results in attempting to
value suffering in terms of money must be the restraint and common
sense of the jury . . . . "40 Similarly, as explained by the Oregon
Supreme Court4I in holding that the condition of being susceptible to a
disease is a compensable form of mental suffering:
We believe, as a matter of common sense, that the jury can properly
make a larger award of damages in a case involving a skull fracture
of such a nature as to result in a susceptibility to meningitis than in
a case involving a skull fracture of such a nature as not to result in
such danger or risk or susceptibility.42
So too a jury can use common sense in making a larger award for
damages which include fear or anxiety over a future illness.
Recent decisions have evidenced a growing acceptance of permit
ting recovery for varied forms of mental suffering, including present
fear of future illness. 43 A plaintiff has been found to be entitled to
damages for pain and suffering in a tort action when the pain and
suffering is evidenced only by the plaintiirs subjective complaints. 44 A
claim of mental suffering need only be proven by a fair preponderance
of the evidence. 45 The fields of medical science and mental health
have advanced sufficiently to permit a trier of fact to determine the
extent of mental suffering to the same degree as physical suffering. 46
The judicial trend toward acceptance of recovery for mental suffering
is evident from other areas of recovery in tort actions, including recov
39. Id. at 23, 152 N.E. 2d at 254, 176 N.Y.S. 2d at 1001 (Froessel, J., dissenting).
The dissenting opinion argued further that "legal suffering does not include mental suffer
ing in contemplation of injury which may never develop." Id.
40. MCCORMICK, supra note I, § 88, at 319.
41. Feist v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 267 Or. 402, 517 P.2d 675, (1973) (four year old
was struck on head by falling cash register at the defendant's store, fracturing the child's
skull).
42. Id. at 412, 517 P.2d at 680. See also Smith v. Boston & Maine R.R., 187 N.H.
246, 258, 177 A. 729, 738 (1935) (that there is a possibility of illness only does not alter
mental suffering "unless the jury found the fear so fantastic as to make them believe that it
was not in fact entertained. ").
43. See STEIN, supra note 2, §§ 40-42.
44. See e.g., De10tt v. Roraback, 179 Conn. 406, 409, 426 A.2d 791, 793 (1980).
45. E.g. Buckley v. Lovallo, 2 Conn. App. 579, 589, 481 A.2d 1286, 1292 (1984) .
(finding error with jury charge requiring a stricter standard of proof for claims of mental
suffering; mental suffering need only be shown by a fair preponderance of the evidence).
46. Id. See also, Culbert v. Sampson, 444 A.2d 433, 436 (Me. 1970).
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ery for negligently or intentionally inflicted mental suffering absent
physical injury,47 bystander recovery,48 and recovery for traumatic
neurosis. 49
IV.

RECOVERY FOR POSSIBLE FUTURE MEDICAL CONDITIONS

Many medical conditions are known to occur with increased fre
quency after trauma even though they are not certain to develop.
These include meningitis and epilepsy following injury to the head,
sympathetic eye loss, and cancer. One of the earliest permitted
grounds for recovery for anxiety was fear of hydrophobia resulting
from a dog bite. 50 Several courts have permitted recovery for anxiety
over developing these possible medical conditions following an injury
even though the plaintiff has not established that the condition will
develop.51
A.

Cancerophobia

One important area of recovery is for fear of cancer, or cancer
ophobia. As early as 1912, a North Carolina court recognized fear of
cancer as a source of mental suffering. 52 Fear of cancer may occur
when the plaintiff is overexposed to radiation from an x-ray or some
other source that causes bums which in tum may result in cancer at
some time in the future. 53 Also common is the fear of cancer after a
47. For a general discussion of recovery for mental distress absent physical injury,
see W. PROSSER & W. KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 54, at 359-62 (5th ed. 1984).
48. Id. at 365-67.
49. E.g., Murphy v. Penn. Fruit Co., 274 Pa. Super. 427, 418 A.2d 480 (1980)
($450,000 verdict for injuries arising out of a stabbing incident in the defendant's parking
lot included damages for psychiatric changes of a permanent nature); Rennick v. Freuhauf
Corp., 82 Wis. 2d 793, 264 N.W.2d 264 (1978) (chronic anxiety reaction caused by accident
was compensable); Lalonde v. Weaver, 360 So.2d 542 (La. 1978).
50. See e.g., Warner v. Chamberlain, 12 Del.(7 Houst.) 18, 30 A. 638 (1884).
51. See text accompanying notes 54-69 infra.
52. Alley v. Charlotte Pipe & Foundry Co., 159 N.C. 327, 74 S.E. 885 (1912)(testi
mony by physician that cancer would likely follow severe molten metal burn admissible as
tending to prove acute mental suffering). Id. at 331, 74 S.E. at 886.
53. See e.g., Lorenc v. Chemirad Corp., 37 N.J. 56, 179 A.2d 401 (1962), in which
the plaintiff, a physician, was awarded $25,000 for injuries to his hands resulting from his
opening a metal cylinder containing a bottle of ethyleneimine, causing chronic ulceration
and breakdown of the skin. The court noted that it was not clear whether the jury accepted
the suggestion of probable future cancer or awarded compensation for the plaintiffs fear of
developing cancer. Id. at 76, 179 A.2d at 411. See also Anderson v. Welding Testing
Laboratory, Inc., 304 So.2d 351 (La. 1974), in which expert testimony showed that plaintiff
was likely to develop cancer 20 to 30 years after his injury caused by handling a radioactive
pill. In reinstating the trial court's award, which had been reduced by the appellate court,
the supreme court noted that:
While to a scientist in his ivory tower the possibility of cancerous growth may be
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traumatic injury to a part of the body.54 In one case, a female plaintiff
who was injured in an motor vehicle accident was compensated for
anxiety over a resulting bruise on the breast bone which she feared
would result in cancer. 55
A recent federal decision highlights the significance of recovery
for cancerophobia. In Weatherill v. University of Chicago,56 two fe
male plaintiffs sought damages for injuries caused by their exposure in
utero to diethylstilbestrol, DES, which was administered to their re
spective mothers as part of an experiment conducted by the defendant
university. At the time of trial neither plaintiff suffered from any can
cerous or pre-cancerous condition. They alleged, however, that their
prenatal exposure to DES significantly enhanced the likelihood of con
tracting cancer in the future. The plaintiffs sought damages for their
fear of developing cancer, not for the increased risk of cancer itself. 57
The court held that the plaintiffs need only establish reasonable fear of
developing cancer and were not required to establish with reasonable
certainty that cancer would in fact develop. 58
Compensation for fear of future complications is especially appro
priate in actions involving prenatal exposure to DES, radiation expo
sure, and actions for damages for asbestosis and related diseases. In a
recent decision, the court of appeals for the fifth circuit permitted re
covery for fear of the possibility of cancer where the plaintiff, an insu
lation worker, had been exposed to asbestos in the course of his
employment.59 In such instances it is possible that cancer may de
velop in the future, although the illness may not occur for some time
and its development is often not certain. The knowledge that cancer
may occur at some future time is clearly a source of worry and, as
so minimal as to be untroubling, we are not prepared to hold that the trier of fact
erred in finding compensable this real possibility to the worrying workman, faced
every minute of his life with a disabled and sometimes painful hand to remind
him of his fear.
Id. at 353.
54. East. Ala. Express Co. v. Dupes, 271 Ala. 504, 124 So.2d 809 (1960).
55. Dempsey v. Hartley, 94 F. Supp. 918 (E.D. Pa. 1951).
56. 565 F. Supp. 1553 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
57. Id. at 1556.
58. Id. at 1559. The court rejected the defendant's argument that the plaintiffs were
required to establish that the feared future injury was reasonably certain to develop from a
present injury. Accord Ferrara v. Galluchio, 5 N.Y.2d 16, 19-20, 152 N.E.2d 249, 252, 176
N.Y.S.2d 996,999 (1958) (In order to recover for mental anguish a basis for "mental anxi
ety" must be established, but the plaintiff need not prove certainty of the development of
the illness feared.).
59. Dartez v. Fibre Board Corp., Docket No. 83-2504 (5th Cir. July 15, 1985).
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such, is compensable. 60
Often a plaintiff's fear of susceptibility to future medical disability
is based upon a physician's disclosure of the increased susceptibility or
possibility of illness. A physician's disclosure has been found to be a
reasonable basis for anxiety by the injured person. 61 In a New York
case of first impression, the court noted the novelty of the wrongdoer's
liability for "purely mental suffering arising from the information the
plaintiff received from a doctor to whom she went for treatment of the
original injury."62 In that case the treating physician suggested that
radiation burns received by the plaintiff and caused by the defendant's
negligence in taking x-rays should be checked periodically because the
burns might become cancerous. The doctor's recommendation was
the basis for the plaintiff's cancerophobia. The court, in a divided
opinion, found that the second doctor's advice increased the plaintiff's
mental anguish. Increased mental anguish is compensable to the same
extent that subsequent physical aggravation of an injury is compensa
ble. The New York court concluded: "[F]reedom from mental distur
bance is now a protected interest in this state. "63
B.

Epilepsy

Epilepsy and meningitis frequently develop following trauma to
the head. The chances of either developing are often slight, but the
possibility may continue for a number of years.64 In a Louisiana ac
tion, the plaintiff sustained a cerebral concussion as a result of a motor
vehicle accident. 65 Medical testimony was presented to the effect that
there was a two percent to a five percent chance that the plaintiff
would develop epilepsy in the future. 66 In upholding the jury award,
the court explained: "While we agree. . . that Mrs. Heider has not
proved the existence of epilepsy, we certainly concur with the trial
judge in his conclusion that she has proved the existence of her fear of
60. See e.g., Wetherill v. Univ. of Chicago 565 F. Supp. 1553, 1561 (E.D. Ill. 1983).
61. STEIN, supra note 2, § 42.
62. Ferrara v. Galluchio, 5 N.Y.2d 16, 19-20, 152 N.E.2d 249, 252, 176 N.Y.S.2d
996,999 (1958). See also Baylor v. Tyrrell, 177 Neb. 812, 824-25131 N.W.2d 393, 402
(1964) (disclosure by physician that in the five years following a hip fracture, the 77-year
old plaintiff's hip may deteriorate, coupled with actual deterioration, was a reasonable basis
for the plaintiff'S fear of future disability).
63. Ferrara v. Galluchio, 5 N.Y.2d 16,21,152 N.E.2d 249, 252,176 N.Y.S.2d 996,
999 (1958).
64. B. Jennett, Epilepsy After Blunt Head Injuries, found in LATE EFFECTS OF HEAD
INJURY (1969).
65. Heider v. Employers Mutual Liability Ins. Co. of Wis., 231 So.2d 438 (La. 1970).
66. Id. at 441-442.
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becoming an epileptic and its adverse effects on her."67 In a recent
Kentucky decision, the court reinstated the jury's verdict which in
cluded an award for pain and suffering in the amount of
$224,500.00. 68 As a result of a motor vehicle accident, the plaintiff in
that case suffered a fractured skull which caused leakage of cerebral
spinal fluid, which in tum created a possibility of future complications
including meningitis. 69 The plaintiffs constant fear that she might de
velop meningitis and the effect of that fear upon her life justified the
large award for pain and suffering. 7o Other jurisdictions have likewise
permitted recovery for fear of epilepsy or meningitis following head
trauma. 71
C.

Sympathetic Eye Loss

The loss of an eye is clearly a cause for anxiety, not only because
of the injury itself, but also because of the possible loss of the remain
ing eye. In a recent Texas decision, a 44 year old plaintiff suffered the
loss of his right eye during the course of surgery for reattaching the
retina.72 At trial, the plaintiff testified that he would continue to have
anxiety over the injury for the remainder of his life. 73 The plaintiff
stated that he "constantly worries about something happening to his
left eye and about what would happen if he lost his present job."74 On
appeal the court found that the $500,000 jury verdict was not exces
sive, considering the evidence of the plaintiffs mental anguish, which
included worry concerning his well-being.7 5 In Walsh v. Brody, the
67.
68.

Id. at 442.
Davis v. Gravis, 672 S.W.2d 928 (Ky. 1984).
69. Id. at 929-30. The plaintiff was advised by one physician that she should un
dergo an operation to stop the leakage of fluid in order to avoid the possibility of meningi
tis. A second physician warned the plaintiff against the operation because of the Iife
threatening complications involved. Id. Thus, the plaintiff suffered from anxiety over the
fear of meningitis, as well as anxiety about whether or not to undergo the dangerous opera
tion. Id. at 930.
70. Id. at 933.
71. See also McCall v. United States, 206 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1962) ($40,000
award to minor plaintiff for head injuries upheld, in part because of possibility of future
epilepsy); Armour & Co. v. Cartledge, 176 So. 334 (1937) (jury entitled to consider possibil
ity of future epilepsy as evidence of the plaintiirs present condition); Davis v. Gravis, 672
S.W.2d 928, 933 (Ky 1984).
72. Cezeaux v. Libby, 539 S.W.2d 187 (Tex. 1976). This was a malpractice action
against the anesthesiologist· for failure to administer an adequate dosage of anesthesia to
insure immobility during the operation. The plaintiff moved while a doctor had a needle in
his eye, resulting in injury to the eye.
73. Id. at 189.
74. Id. The plaintiirs testimony was supported by the testimony of his physician.
75. Id. at 189-90.
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appellate court found error in the trial court's refusal to permit medi
cal testimony concerning the effect of the plaintitrs eye injury caused
by the tortfeasor on future surgery she required for a pre-existing cat
aract. 76 The appellate court ruled that the medical testimony was
needed to establish the plaintiff's damages, including the effect of the
injury on her anticipated cataract surgery and her claim of mental
anxiety resulting from the injury.77 A new trial was ordered to enable
the plaintiff to establish the effect of the eye injury on her mental
state. 78

D. Injury to Unborn Child
A somewhat specialized area of recovery is for the anxiety of a
pregnant mother for fear of injury to her unborn child arising out of
injuries to the mother herself. 79 In a number of decisions, the appre
hension of a pregnant woman that her child may be born injured or
dead as a result of injury to the mother has been found to be an ele
ment of damages. 8o As one court reasoned, since any mental suffering
that is a natural result of a physical injury is recoverable, the anxiety
of an injured pregnant woman for the well-being of her unborn child
is a natural result of the mother's injury and compensable. 8 I In
Nomey v. Great American Indemnity CO.,82 the court increased the
jury's award of damages to a woman, who was more than eight
months pregnant at the time she was injured, for mental pain and anx
iety caused by the possibility of injury to her unborn child. The court
found the jury award inadequate on the grounds that, though the nor
mal delivery occured eight days after the accident, the mother's anxi
ety continued for some weeks. 83
76. 220 Pa. Super. 293, 286 A.2d 666 (1971).
77. Id. at 297, 286 A.2d at 669. The court stated that "(w)ithout this proof of the
increase in hazards attendant to the cataract surgery, the jury could not properly assess
plaintiff's claim for mental anxiety." Id.
78. Id. at 298, 286 A.2d at 669.
79. MCCORMICK, supra note I, § 88, at 315: "[I]n case of injury to a pregnant wo
man, the apprehension that the child will be born disfigured" is compensable.
80. E.g., Atlanta Veterans Transportation, Inc. v. Cagle, 106 Ga. App. 551, 127
S.E.2d 702 (1962); Davis v. Murry, 29 GA. App. 120, 113 ED 827 (1927); Prescott v.
Robinson, 74 N.H. 460, 69 A. 522 (1908); Feheley v. Senders, 170 Or. 457, 135 P.2d 283
(1943).
81. Feheley v. Senders, 170 Or. 457, 460-61, 135 P.2d 283, 285 (1943).
82. 121 S.2d 763, 766 (La. 1960).
83. Id. The court increased the jury award for anxiety from $500 to $1,000. Id. Cf.
Johnson v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 136 S.2d 446 (La. App.1961), in which the
court found adequate an award of $200 for the anxiety suffered by a pregnant woman for
the health of her unborn child. Id. at 448. The court found that the plaintiff's anxiety was

FUTURE DISABILITY

1985)

877

E. Apprehension of Death
Compensation may also be had for apprehension of death. In one
Connecticut decision,84 the appellate court found no error in a jury
charge concerning mental suffering, including fear of death.85 The de
cedent died during the course of delivery of her child. She was con
scious for several hours prior to death, during which time she
complained of pain and underwent therapeutic measures and unusual
procedures, which "may well have resulted in an apprehension of
death."86 The court concluded that the jury could reasonably have
inferred that the decedent suffered mental anguish because of the ap
prehension of death.87 In a Louisiana action, recovery for apprehen
sion of death was permitted where the decedent was hospitalized for
41 days prior to death, during which time he worried about whether
he would live, walk again, or father children. 88 He also had dreams
and premonitions of death.89

v.

REQUIREMENTS FOR RECOVERY

Some courts have permitted recovery where there is not even a
possibility that the feared disability will develop. Unlike the case law
discussed above, these are cases in which there is no medical evidence
mitigated by her status as an unmarried mother who was giving birth to her fourth child in
as many years. Id.
In one instance, anxiety of the parents of a child born alive but potentially brain dam
aged was included as an element of damages in a case of obstetrical malpractice. Friel v.
Vineland and Obstetrical and Gynecological Professional Assoc., 166 N.J. Super. 579, 400
A.2d 147 (1979). But, damages are generally not recoverable for "loss of the unborn child"
where injuries result in a miscarriage. Webb v. Snow, 102 Utah 435, 444, 132 P.2d 114, 119
(1942).
84. Katsetos v. Nolan, 170 Conn. 637, 368 A.2d 172 (1972). See also Orlo v. Con
necticut Co., 128 Conn. 231,236,21 A.2d 402,404 (1941), for earlier decisions permitting
compensation for apprehension of death.
85. The charge provided in part: "A person injured by the wrongdoing of another is
just as much entitled to be compensated for mental suffering caused thereby as for physical
suffering, including the fear that death will result." Katsetos v. Nolan, 170 Conn. 637, 655
n.3, 638 A.2d 172, 182 n.3 (1976).
86. Id. at 655, 638 A.2d at 182. See also, WRIGHT, CONNECTICUT JURY INSTRUC
TIONS, § 226 (3d ed. 1981).
87. Katsetos v. Nolan, 170 Conn. 637, 655, 638 A.2d 172, 182 (1972). Accord, Fair
banks v. State, 143 Conn. 653, 660, 124 A.2d 893, 898 (1958)(reasonable inference that the
plaintiff suffered mental anguish because of the apprehension of death).
88. Roundtree v. Technical Welding & Fabrication Co., 364 So.2d 1325, 1331 (La.
1978)(jury awarded the plaintiff a total of $668, 157.32; $125,000 of the award was for "con
scious intense pain and suffering, emotional distress, abject fear of death and/or permanent
paralysis." Id. at 1330-31.).
89. Id. at 1331. The decedent also complained of pain which he described as "hell
on earth." Id.
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that the disability feared is related to the injury sustained as a result of
the tortfeasor's negligence. In Murphy v. Penn Fruit Co., the plaintiff
sought damages for injuries sustained as a result of a stabbing incident
in the defendant's parking 10t. 90 The plaintiff sustained severe injuries
to the heart, left lung, and breast. The injuries healed. 91 At trial the
plaintiff complained of fear of heart attacks, cancer, and brain damage,
none of which had any causal connection to her physical injuries. 92
The jury was instructed that it could consider damages for pain and
suffering and mental anguish and returned a verdict for $450,000. 93
The judgment was affirmed by the appellate court which stated that
"in appropriate cases the plaintiff can recover substantial damages for
a psychic injury where she has only a minor physical injury."94 Simi
larly, a New Hampshire court permitted a plaintiff struck by a train
while walking on railroad tracks to recover for her mistaken fear of
paralysis, which arose after she was injured. 95
More often there is a requirement that the plaintiffs anxiety have
some reasonable basis. In one case, the court found no error in an
instruction to the jury requiring reasonable basis for the plaintiffs
mental suffering. 96 At least two jurisdictions, Wisconsin and New
York, follow the rule that absent a reasonable basis for fear of future
illness, it is against public policy to hold the original tortfeasor ac
countable. 97 In Howard v. Mt. Sinai Hospitai,98 the Wisconsin court
overturned a plaintiffs verdict in a malpractice action, finding that the
plaintiffs cancerophobia resulting from the alleged loss of a broken
catheter in the plaintiffs arm was too remote and that compensation
for such fear would go against public policy.99 New York requires
90.
91.
92.
93.

274 Pa. Super. 427, 418 A.2d 480 (Pa. 1980).
Id. at 435, 418 A.2d at 484.
Id.
[d.
94. Id. at 436, 418 A.2d at 485.
95. Smith v. Boston & Maine Rail Co., 87 N.H. 246, 177 A. 729 (1935). The court
explained that the plaintiff was entitled to recover for her fear that her legs might become
paralyzed following injuries she sustained when struck by a freight train: "The fact of a
fear so caused . . . would be an element of damages for their consideration, even though
the fear was mistaken. That the fear regarded a possibility rather than a probability would
not alter the reality of the mental suffering .. ,," Id. at 258, 177 A. at 738.
96. E.g. Baylor v. Tyrrell, 177 Neb. 812, 131 N.W.2d 393 (1964). See also Heider v.
Employees Mut. Ins. Co. of Wise., 231 So.2d 438 (La. 1970) (in which the "possibility" of
future epilepsy was well founded on medical evidence and the court held that the possibility
could cause mental anguish). Id. at 441-42.
97. E.g. Howard v. Mt. Sinai Hospital, 63 Wis. 2d 515, 217 N.W.2d 383 (1974);
Ferrara v. Galluchio, 5 N.Y.2d 16, 152 N.E. 2d 249, 176 N.Y.S. 2d 996 (1958).
98. 63 Wis. 2d 515, 217 N.W.2d 383 (1974).
99. Howard v. Mt. Sinai Hospital, 63 Wis. 2d 515, 519 217 N.W.2d 383, 385. ct,
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something more than a tenuous causal connection between the original
injury and the ultimate damage for which the tortfeasor will be held
liable. The standard applied is that liability for damages caused by
wrong ceases at a point dictated by public policy or common sense. 100
Thus, some courts limit recovery for anxiety by requiring some rea
sonable basis for the fear, whereas other courts permit recovery for
anxiety even where it has no reasonable basis. With either approach,
the plaintiff can be compensated for a fear of future complications that
are only possible.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The case law discussed in this article, though not exhaustive, does
support the proposition that anxiety over the possible future conse
quences of an injury can be an important aspect of damages in a per
sonal injury action. Because of the personal nature of pain and
suffering and, in particular, anxiety over future disability, an award for
these elements of damages will vary greatly from case to case. In the
appropriate case anxiety over possible future disability may be con
stant and may continue for a long period of time. Such worry clearly
affects the injured person's well-being. Anxiety can invade every as
pect of an individual's life including his relationship to family and
friends, employment, mental disposition, and outlook for the future.
Anxiety over possible future disability is an element of damages the
jury will consider and the damages awarded will reflect the plaintifrs
anxiety. Because of the significance of the plaintiff's fear and its com
pensable nature, recovery for such fear can make up a substantial por
tion of a plaintiff's award. Accordingly, this element of damages
should be explored and developed in all appropriate personal injury
actions.

Dickerson v. St. Peter's Hospital, 72 Wash. 2d 196,432 P.2d 293 (1967), in which the court
permitted the jury to determine the amount of damages to which the plaintiff was entitled
as a result of the loss of a catheter and the resulting possibility that the catheter might be in
the plaintiffs body. The jury could award damages for the possibility that the catheter was
in the plaintiffs body, but could not determine whether or not the catheter was actually in
the plaintiffs body, since the latter was too speculative. Id. at 200, 432 P.2d at 295.
100. Milks v. McIver, 264 N.Y. 267,269, 190 N.E. 487, 488 (1934), cited approvingly
in Ferrara v. Galluchio, 5 N.Y. 2d 16, 20, 152 N.E. 2d 249,251, 176 N.Y.S.2d 996, 1000
(1958).

